introduction
The recent global financial crisis refocused the attention of policy makers and economists onto fiscal policy as a potentially strong tool in stimulating economic growth. Although for decades there has been a global tendency for fiscal stabiliza tion to be performed mainly by the work of automatic stabilizers rather than di scretionary fiscal policy, governments as well as institutions traditionally seen as symbols of fiscal austerity (such as the International Monetary Fund or European Commission) opted for large fiscal stimuli during the latest economic downturn.
Still, the eventual effects of a stimulus package are uncertain and empirical rese arch shows no absolute consensus on the effects of fiscal policy on macroecono mics. Most studies prove a positive multiplier for an exogenous government spen ding shock and a negative multiplier for an exogenous government tax shock. Nevertheless, the size (and sign) of a fiscal multiplier is country-, time-, estima tion method-and regime-dependent. A revealing example of how differences in size of a fiscal multiplier affect potential fiscal stimuli effectiveness was recently provided by Barro (2009) . In an article for the Wall Street Journal Barro discusses the recovery program proposed by Cristina Romer, Chair of President Obama's Council of Economic Advisers. Namely, when estimating the overall job gains for the proposed 787 billion USD stimulus package, Cristina Romer used 1.5 as the size of the government spending multiplier. Barro's opinion was that the size of this multiplier was essentially zero and therefore, as pointed by Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2010:2) "the difference between Romer's and Barro's views of the world amounts to a staggering 3.7 million jobs by the end of 2010".
Diverging predictions of the effectiveness of fiscal stimuli can be found in theore tical literature as well. Real Business Cycle (RBC) models assume that an increase in government consumption will be completely neutralized by the reduction of private consumption (Baxter and King, 1993 or Fatás and Mihov, 2001 ). Keynesian models argue that a government consumption increase leads to an in crease in private consumption and output (Blanchard, 2003) 1 . However, Pappa (2003:2) indicates that differences in predicting fiscal policy effects arise because fiscal shocks are difficult to identify in practice due to "endogeneity of fiscal va riables, interactions between fiscal and monetary policy variables, delays between planning, approval and implementation of fiscal policies and scarceness of reaso nable zero-identifying restrictions". This paper studies fiscal multipliers in Croatia using two different frameworks for estimation. On one hand a linear structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model as proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) is used to estimate the overall sign and size of a government spending and tax shock on output, private consumption and private investment. The novelty of the SVAR model in this paper with respect to other works published in the field of fiscal policy on the Croatian case (i.e. Ravnik and Žilić, 2011; Šimović and Deskar-Škrbić, 2013) are the following: (1) the data set is based on a longer time span (1996Q1-2011Q4), (2) estimated mul tipliers involve not only the effect of total government spending and taxes but government spending components as well, (3) fiscal policy effects are investiga ted not only with respect to output, but also with respect to private consumption and private investment, and (4) multipliers are converted into monetary values (in kuna), which is much more friendly for readers and gives a real feeling of the ef fect.
On the other hand a smooth transition vector autoregression (STVAR) model is used to investigate whether the size of a fiscal multiplier is different in good and bad times. This analysis as well embraces the effects (multipliers) of different government spending components on output, private consumption and investment.
The main results are in line with Keynesian theory. A spending shock positively affects output, private consumption and private investment and the response is significant within a year. Moreover, when investigating the effect of government consumption versus government investment, the positive effect of the first with respect to output and private consumption is persistent and significant throughout the whole time horizon. A tax shock leads to a drop in output, private consumption and private investment. If the regime-switching models are considered, the results are conclusive in the fact that fiscal multipliers tend to be larger in times of econo mic downturn in Croatia than in times of expansion when they are mostly insigni ficant. Such results are in line with similar research conducted in the case of other (developed and developing) countries. This paper is structured as follow: section two gives some insight into the theore tical and empirical background about fiscal multipliers. The third section is devo ted to a brief explanation of the methodologies and data used in the analysis. Section four presents the results, while the last, fifth, section is reserved for con cluding remarks.
theoretical and empirical background
In general, a fiscal multiplier refers to a change in output ΔY occurring after an exogenous one-unit change in a fiscal policy instrument ΔFI (the fiscal instrument FI can be represented by total government spending G, total taxes T or their sub component -transfers G tr or direct taxes T d for instance). For example, in the case in which a one-kuna increase in government spending in Croatia causes a 50 lipa increase in GDP, then the government spending multiplier is said to be 0.5. Such a multiplicative effect varies across the time horizon, so it is important to stress the following definitions:
The impact multiplier measures the ratio of a contemporaneous change in output to an exogenous change in fiscal policy instrument at time of impact (occurrence of shock), i.e. time t 0 :
(1)
The multiplier in a future period n is the ratio of change in output in time t 0 +n to an exogenous change in the fiscal policy instrument at time of impact t 0 : (2) The cumulative multiplier is defined as the cumulative change in output over the cumulative change in fiscal policy instrument at some time horizon n: where i=1,2,…,n
The peak multiplier represents the largest change in output after a change in fi scal policy instrument over any time horizon n:
Empirical and theoretical studies show that fiscal multipliers vary in sign and size, being also country-, time-, methodology-and economic conditions-specific. In fact, there is no absolute consensus on the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomics, and empirical results agree on one fact only, i.e. that a positive government spending shock has a positive (and significant) effect on output 2 .
Additionally, Spilimbergo, Symansky and Schindler (2009:2) point out that the size of the multiplier is larger if (1) "leakages" are few (i.e. only a small part of the stimulus is saved or spent on imports), (2) monetary conditions are accommodati ve (i.e. the interest rate does not increase as a consequence of fiscal expansion), and (3) a country's fiscal position after the stimulus is sustainable. More over, the se authors signal that the degree of financial market development and intermedia tion, as well as institutional features and the general macroeconomic and financial conditions in the domestic economy and externally, also have influence on the size and sign of a fiscal multiplier 3 .
Although there was a predominant view that fiscal policy should mainly operate through the work of automatic stabilizers, the latest economic crisis showed that a growing number of governments opted for discretionarism to boost economic ac tivity 4 . Therefore, fiscal policy is at the focus of academic and policy makers' de bates concerning the question: what is the transmission of fiscal policy shocks? Especially in the case of an economic downturn, policymakers should be able to predict how a discretionary change in a fiscal instrument (or a set of instruments) will affect economic activity, in order to be as efficient and effective as possible in smoothing business cycles.
As already mentioned, among others, the answer is conditioned by the methodo logy used in identifying fiscal shocks and by the employed identification restric tions. Still, much of the empirical research in this area is based on two methodo logies: (1) linear structural vector autoregression (SVAR) models and (2) lineari zed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models 5, 6 . Although frequen tly applied, both methodologies have two main shortcomings pinpointed by Par ker (2011:6): first, the government spending multiplier is time-invariant and inde 2 It is important to point out that the agreement about the government spending effect on output is mainly due to the fact that much of the literature and research investigates fiscal policy on the basis of US data. Fiscal policy transmission mechanism is known to be country-specific (since there are no two identical tax and/or fiscal systems on the world) and therefore there are works based on the same country case that do not find such unambiguous results as in case of the US. For example, investigation into the case of Germany is not as conclusive as in the US case with respect to the size and statistical significance of the effect of government spending on output (Höppner, 2001; Perotti, 2005; Marcellino, 2002 and Heppke-Falk et al., 2006 ). 3 For a detailed explanation of the mentioned determinants see Spilimbergo et al. (2009) . 4 Spilimbergo, Symansky and Schindler (2009) point out that countries turned to fiscal policy as their pri mary stabilization tool either because of changes in their monetary regime (such as currency board or par ticipation in a monetary union) or because financial conditions deteriorated to the point at which monetary policy became ineffective. 5 Moreover, the study of fiscal policy effects on economic activity proposes three additional schemes for iden tifying fiscal policy shocks: (1) the recursive approach introduced by Sims (1980) , (2) the sign-restrictions approach developed by Mountford and Uhlig (2005) , and (3) the event-study (narrative or Dummy approach) proposed by Ramey and Saphiro (1998) for studying the isolated effects of unexpected increases in government spending for defense purposes. 6 Broad surveys of the literature estimating fiscal multipliers are provided in Parker (2011) and Ramey (2011). pendent of the state of the economy, and second, a linear model forces a multiplier to be independent of the size of the stimulus.
The SVAR approach to investigating fiscal multipliers was introduced by Blan chard and Perotti (2002) in research on quarterly data about government spending, taxes and output in the US. Subsequently, much of the empirical research, inclu ding this, when investigating fiscal multipliers has relied on the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) SVAR method 7 . Table 1 summarizes selected main findings about spending and tax multipliers in developed and developing countries using such a methodological framework. positive -no effect - 7 Hebous for instance shows that in investigations of government spending effects, in a total of 42 country cases, 22 of them employ the Blanchard and Perotti SVAR, 9 the sign restriction approach, 5 the recursive framework while the narrative and expectation augmented setups are presented in 4 and 2 cases respectively (2009: [13] [14] [15] 8 . These findings appear to be in line with Keynesian arguments in favor of using discretionary government spending in downturn periods to stimulate aggregate demand. Table 2 summarizes the spending and tax multipliers during recessions and expansions in selected studies. Among all it is worth noting 8 It is important to point out that works in the field of fiscal policy when investigating state-dependent mul tipliers employ non-linear approaches, mainly STVAR and TVAR (threshold vector autoregressive) models. The main difference is that in a TVAR setup the economy discretely changes from one state to the other, i.e. it jumps from regime to regime, while a STVAR model allows such a switch to occur smoothly. Moreover, within a STVAR approach all observations are used for the estimation of parameters under both regimes. that the highest negative short-term effect on output after a positive tax shock was recorded in France, being 1.6 in bad times and 0.7 in good times (Baum, Po plawski-Ribeiro and Weber, 2012), while a positive government spending shock in bad times mostly increases output in the short term in the euro area and the US (Batini, Callegari and Melina, 2012) with a multiplier of 2.6 and 2.2, respectively. 
data and methodology
The empirical analysis of fiscal multipliers in this paper is based on two methodo logies. On one hand the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) SVAR setup is chosen from the set of linear approaches, while on the other hand, in order to investigate whe ther fiscal multipliers differ in Croatia in good and bad times, the smooth transi tion vector autoregression (STVAR) is applied, as in Auerbach and Gorodni chenko (2010b).
the svar specification
The baseline specification includes three variables: the log of real government spending g t , the log of real output y t and the log of real government revenue r t ("net taxes" or "taxes" for short). Denoting the vector of endogenous variables by X t and the vector of reduced form innovations by U t , the reduced form VAR model can be written as: ,
where , C(L) is a autoregressive lag polynomial matrix and 9 . 9 Reduced form residuals U t represent a linear combination of different structural innovations and therefore have no economic interpretation.
The reduced form residuals and can be thought of as a linear combination of three components (Perotti, 2004:3) : (1) the automatic response of taxes and government spending to innovations in output, (2) the systematic discretionary response of policymakers to output, and (3) the random discretionary shocks to fiscal policy. The latter encompasses the structural fiscal shocks, which unlike the reduced form residuals are uncorrelated among each other.
Defining the vector of spending, output and tax structural shocks as , U t can be written as a linear combination of structural shocks V t in the following way ,
where A and B are n x n matrices describing immediate relations between the re duced form residuals and the structural shocks 10 . Therefore, the structural VAR can be obtained by multiplying (5) by matrix A and using (6) , which leads to the following:
The matrix representation of the latter is:
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) argue that governments cannot react within the same quarter to changes of the macroeconomic setting mainly because fiscal policy decisions involve many agents (parliament, government and society) and therefore need a long period of time for implementation. Hence the systematic discretionary response is absent in quarterly data. Therefore the reduced-form fiscal shocks capture only the automatic response of fiscal variables to economic activity (meaning that ).
Without loss of generality, one can write: ,
, and (
,
10 In such a set up A and B are n x n parameter matrices that require identifying restrictions to be imposed on A and B to obtain an unique relation, because reduced form residuals have no economic interpretation and different structural forms can give the same reduced form VAR model (see for instance Gottshalk, 2001 ). When this is the case, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use available exogenous in formation on the elasticity of spending and taxes with respect to GDP to compute the appropriate value of the coefficients . These elasticities allow fiscal shocks to be constructed in cyclically adjusted terms as follows:
. (13) As mentioned earlier, this study assumes that expenditure does not respond to output within a quarter because it is predetermined in a budgetary plan and there fore not elastic in the short run. Thus, is set to zero according to the assumption that government spending is solely under the control of the fiscal authority. However, worth noting is that some recent studies challenge this assumption. Among others, Rodden and Wibbles (2010) find evidence of spending elasticity of 0.17 with respect to output at the state and local level in the US. However, this work (like others in this field) is based on annual data, so it is reasonable to assume that such a procyclicality vanishes in quarterly frequencies.
In line with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) the coefficient is estimated as the weighted average of different revenue components' output elasticity. The output elasticity of net taxes is 0.92 in the Croatian case (see appendix B for a detailed view about the estimations of exogenous elasticities), meaning that a 1% increase in output (GDP) generates a 0.92% increase in taxes. This estimation is in line with results obtained by studies covering other countries. It matches the tax elasti city with respect to output in the German case shown in Perotti (2002) but is lower than that in the US or Canada for example. If it is compared to the tax elasticity obtained in the Croatian case by Ravnik and Žilić (2011) it is 0.03 percentage point lower and not significantly different.
The recovered cyclically adjusted reduced form fiscal shocks represent a linear combination of the two structural fiscal policy shocks, i.e.
. (15) Assuming that a government tends to decide on expenditure first means that , and therefore:
, while
, (17) where is estimated by OLS to retrieve the structural shocks to the fiscal varia bles.
The two estimated structural shocks are orthogonal to the structural shock of ou tput and therefore can be used as instruments when estimating equation (10) using the instrumental variables approach.
So the just-identified three variable baseline SVAR model is the following 11 : (18) where OLS is adopted in estimating and IV in estimating and . The esti mates are presented in the following table. The signs of the contemporaneous effects of spending and taxes on output are, as expected, positive and negative respectively. Moreover, the correlation between cyclically adjusted fiscal shocks results to be very low (-0.14) yielding very low estimates of 12 .
Important to notice is that in alternative specifications the baseline model is exten ded for a GDP component (private consumption or private investment) to a four variable SVAR, where private consumption or investment in turn is ordered third 13 . Moreover, when investigating the effects of particular government spen 11 The system needs restrictions, where n is the number of endogenous variables. 12 The correlation between cyclically adjusted fiscal shocks is very low also in the case when taxes are orde red first. Therefore, small values of and imply that the choice between ordering spending or taxes first does not influence impulse responses and proves the robustness of the results. 13 This order follows the suggestion by Caldara and Kamps (2008) , as in the case of the baseline model. For a detailed discussion on the assumptions behind such ordering, refer to their work. To recall, placing private consumption or private investment in the third place means it does not react contemporaneously to taxes, but is contemporaneously affected by government spending and output shocks. 
the stvar specification
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010a) extend the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) setup by allowing for responses differentiated across recessions and expansions in a regime switching vector autoregression framework, where transitions across sta tes occur smoothly. The main advantage of the STVAR over the SVAR is that it effectively utilizes more information by exploiting variations in the degree to which the economy is in a particular regime (i.e. recession or expansion) so that estimation and inference for each regime is based on a larger set of observations (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2010a:4). Estimating a SVAR for each regime separately may seriously limit the amount of observations in a regime, which ma kes estimates unstable and imprecise.
According to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010a) the baseline smooth transi tion vector autoregression (STVAR) specification is: ,
where (20) ( 21) with ,
, (23) where X t is the vector of endogenous variables, ordered again by taking into ac count the assumed contemporaneous effects amid variables, u t a normal error term, and z t is the indicator of the state of an economy, i.e. an index of the business cycle, normalized to have unit variance so that λ remains scalar invariant. A posi tive z indicates an expansionary phase, while oppositely a negative z indicates a contractionary phase of the business cycle. The matrices Π i and Ω i (where i=R in recession and i=E in expansion) represent the coefficients and variance-covariance matrix of disturbances in two regimes that are the system in a sufficiently deep recession (when ) and in a sufficiently strong expansion (when ). The weights assigned to each regime (expansion and recession) for a given weighting function F(.) vary between 0 and 1 according to the contempo raneous state of the economy zt 16 . the power of fiscal multipliers in croatia financial theory and practice 38 (2) 173-219 (2014) 186 Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010a), this study employs the four quarter moving average of output growth rates as indicator of the state of the eco nomy, and lambda is calibrated on the level of 1.5, making the economy spend 20 percent of the time in recessionary regimes 17 .
Such a model allows two ways for differences to occur in the propagation of struc tural shocks (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2010a:5): (1) contemporaneous via differences in covariance matrices for disturbances Ω E and Ω R , and (2) dynamic via differences in lag polynomials Π E (L) and Π R (L).
In their original work (2010a), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko implement a STVAR approach on a US dataset available in high frequencies, and thus are able to carry out highly nonlinear estimation for a large number of parameters 18 . Thus, in their following work (2010b, p. 3) such an approach for OECD countries would be very challenging due to the short time series with lower frequencies 19 .
Given the importance of expectations in identifying fiscal shocks, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010b) extend the model and control for expectations by using real time forecasts and thus augmenting the equations for the unanticipated com ponent of government spending and/or revenue ( , with FI being the fiscal instrument under examination). This unanticipated component was not accounted for in the SVAR approach; it is newly introduced and measured by the ratio between actual spending (or actual revenue) and its forecasted value in one period earlier (spending t in time t-1, or revenue t in time t-1) 20 . Therefore, the first step is to estimate the SVAR for 21 .
Since this is the case, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010b) modify the aforesaid original approach and follow an approach previously advocated by Jorda (2005) and Stock and Watson (2007) , among others, i.e. rather than estimating the entire system of equations in the STVAR and using these to estimate the impulse response functions, they estimate the impulse responses directly by projecting a varia ble of interest on its own lags and lags of other variables entering the VAR. As pinpointed by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010b:4), this direct projection 17 See appendix D for a plot of the transition function between regimes of expansions and recessions in the Cro atian case. Moreover, it is important to stress that the growth rate data span used in estimating the weighting function is longer than the observation period in the models, i.e. it ranges from 1995Q1 to 2013Q1. In that way there is no loss of the first observations due to the four-quarter moving average representation. 18 To inspect in detail the nonlinear estimation approach, see the appendix in Auerbach and Gorodnich enko (2010a). 19 Although the time span of observations in the Croatian case used in this analysis goes back in history as much as possible, it can be considered relatively short, not only with respect to the available statistics in the case of the US, but also with respect to (older and newer) OECD member states. 20 To obtain values of the unanticipated component Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010b:3) rely on several sources, such as surveys prepared by professional forecasters, projections prepared by governmental or inter national agencies, or other credible sources. In the Croatian case the sources and calculation of unanticipated components is presented in appendix A. 21 For simplicity of notation the unanticipated component of government spending in the equations is denoted by , which corresponds to the variable defined in appendix A as FEgspend. the power of fiscal multipliers in croatia financial theory and practice 38 (2) 173-219 (2014) approach provides a flexible estimation method, which does not impose dynamic restrictions implicitly embedded in VARs and which can conveniently accommo date nonlinearities in the response function.
For example, if the interest is in determining the response of output y t at horizon h after a government spending shock, bearing in mind the vector , then the estimation equation is:
with F(z t ) as defined in equation (22) and h=0,1,…,H. The unanticipated compo nent of government spending ( ) represents the forecast error, i.e. the difference between forecasted and actual government spending in time t-1 for period t. Thus can be interpreted as the "surprise government spending shock" (Auer bach and Gorodnichenko, 2010b:4).
The lag polynomials ( ) in equa tion (24) are used to control for the history of shocks rather than to compute the dynamics, while the coefficients in and can be interpreted as multipliers that show the response of output to a structural shock in government spending in expansions and recessions respectively. 
where the response of Y is constrained to be the same for all z t 's 22 .
The estimation method as set in equation (20) has the following main advantages (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2010b:6): (1) it involves only linear estimation if the parameter λ is fixed, (2) it allows just the equation related to the variable of interest (output, for example) to be estimated, and (3) it does not constrain the shape of the impulse response functions, rather than imposing the pattern genera ted by the SVAR.
the data
As already mentioned, the baseline dataset includes a quarterly dataset from 1996Q1 to 2011Q4 for output (Y t ), government spending (G t ) and government revenue (R t -also referred to as taxes or net taxes in the rest of the paper). Impor 22 Such a constraint implies that , , and for all L and h. tant to stress is that fiscal variables are defined as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) , i.e. both net of transfers, and at the consolidated central government level 23 . All variables are in logarithms, real terms (CPI deflated 2000=100) and seasonally adjusted using the ARIMA X12 algorithm.
According to the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test results, all variables pre sent unit roots in levels and are stationary in first differences (table 4) . 
Although the system is stationary in first differences, the analysis is done using variables in levels, because the focus of the analysis is on the dynamics (i.e. im pulse responses), not the coefficient estimation25. To choose the appropriate lag length the judgment is based on information criteria results, the length of the sam ple and economic sense. To be as parsimonious as possible the VAR lag selection tests included a maximum of four lags. The Akaike criterion (AIC) and final pre diction suggest two lags, while the Schwarz Bayesian (SC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQC) criteria indicate one lag as optimal. This analysis will allow for dynamic interaction up to one lags as suggested by the Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criteria. Such a choice is based on two assumptions: on one hand a lower lag reduces the probability of over fitting the model (because every additional parameter added substantially decreases the power of estimation), and on the other hand Lütkepohl (2005:326) shows that the Akaike criterion asymptotically overestimates the true order with some positive probability.
results
According to the level specification, structural shocks represent as one percentage point increase in the policy variables, while impulse responses represent the per cent change of the responding variable. Still, all fiscal multipliers shown are ex pressed in kuna 26 . To do so, the estimated multiplier value is multiplied by the ratio of the mean of the response variable (in kuna) to the mean of the respective impulse variable (in kuna) 27 . Reported fiscal multipliers for the SVAR approach include the impact multiplier, two cumulative multipliers (at the horizon of 12 quarters and one at 20 quarters) and the peak multiplier, which additionally in 24 Krusec (2003) employs a SVEC (structural vector error correction) model to account for the cointegrating relation(s) and to differentiate between permanent and transitory shocks, when investigating the effects of fiscal policy on output in case of four EMU (Austria, Finland, Germany and Italy) and four non-EMU (US, Great Britain, Australia and Canada) countries. Still, results show that a government spending shock positi vely affects output, while a tax shock leads to a decrease in output, and the size (magnitude) of the effect is very similar to those obtained by other works using a SVAR setup. 25 This is common empirical practice. Studies that estimate a SVAR in levels no matter of the stationarity in first differences are for instance Perotti (2002) Ravnik and Žilić (2011) . In addition, as demon strated by Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) even if the system includes non-stationary variables, the OLS esti mators are still consistent when the model is estimated in levels. 26 As mentioned, this Section reports multipliers monetarized in kuna, while the impulse response functions are presented in appendix E. 27 For example: say that the estimated impact multiplier of government spending on output is 0.15 and the ratio of the mean of GDP to the mean of government spending is 2.5, then at impact a one kuna increase in government spending leads to an increase in output of 38 lipa (=0.15*2.5). It is important to point that Ramey and Zubairy (2013) discuss on the US case how such a procedure in converting percentage changes into dollar changes is not precise and leads to higher values of fiscal multipliers. The authors stress that the ratio of the mean of output to the mean of government spending on the US case depends upon the time span of the sam ple, varying from 2 to 24 in the 1889-2009 sample or from 4-7 in the post WWII sample. Therefore, Ramey and Zubairy (2013:9-10) suggest an ex ante conversion of output and government spending to the same units using the value of G/Y in each point of time and not averaging. However, such a conversion can be omitted in the Croatian case, since the already limited time-span in case of shortening does not lead to significantly different ratios of the mean of GDP to the mean of government spending. 28, 29 . Important to notice is that, not only due to different methodological approaches, presented fiscal multi pliers may not be directly comparable, but this reporting strategy better highlights the differences between obtained regime-and no-regime switching models, which is the main point of this paper. The main point of the STVAR is estimating multi pliers in the expansionary and recessionary phases of the business cycle. Moreover, in all STVAR specifications a linear representation of the corresponding model has been estimated as in equation (25), but these results are not reported since there is no case where they significantly differ from those obtained using the SVAR. Table 5 shows the multiplier effect of government spending and net taxes on ou tput in Croatia using the Blanchard and Perotti estimation approach.
baseline model results
No matter the methodological framework, a positive spending shock positively affects output, while a positive tax shock negatively affects output in Croatia. These findings are in line with those shown in Grdović Gnip (2013) when a five variable SVAR Blanchard and Perotti approach is used 30 . Next, it is possible to observe that macroeconomics reacts according to the Keynesian assumption of higher multiplier effect in downturn times, the average multiplier being above 2 and significant, meaning that a one kuna increase in government spending would lead to an increase in output of more than 2 kuna in the medium and long term.
In the SVAR approach output reacts negatively to a tax shock only at impact, while in the STVAR setting the reaction follows the same pattern in recession ti mes, while in expansion times it results to be negative irrespective of the time horizon but also insignificant. Moreover, all multipliers in expansion times are insignificant. 28 The average multiplier in recession and expansion is calculated as and res pectively. 29 Important to point out is that Ramey and Zubairy (2013) as well as Owyang, Ramey and Zubairy (2013) provide a detailed discussion about pitfalls in reporting fiscal multipliers in normal and recessionary times. In doing so, they focus on the Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010b) direct projection method as the most widely implemented during the last years. Owyang, Ramey and Zubairy (2013) point out that Auerbach and Gorodnichenko̕ s multipliers are overestimated due to their fundamental assumption how a positive shock to government spending during a low-growth state does not help the economy escape that state. Moreover, they add that the Auerbach and Gorodnichenko assumption about the recession lasting 20 quarters is unreali stic since the data provide information about shorter recessionary periods in the US. Above that, the authors conclude that spending multipliers calculated as in Gorodnichenko (2010a, 2010b) show the response of output after a government spending shock without being rescaled for the effects the same shock exercises on the development in government spending. In line with Auerbach and Gorodnichenko this work also reports the average multiplier across 8, 12 and 20 periods (quarters), being these the average response of output in time t+h (where h equals to 8, 12 or 20) after the initial shock in government spending. 30 The five-variable SVAR includes prices and interest rates in addition to government spending, output and taxes. Robustness of the baseline models was checked by means of several alternatives. In the case of the SVAR approach the estimation was redone by (i) assuming that taxes come first and (ii) using different output elasticity of taxes, i.e. those obtai ned by Ravnik and Žilić (2011) . In the case of the STVAR approach the robustness was checked by (i) replacing the transition variable output growth rates with ou tput gap 31 and (ii) trying a different calibration of lambda, i.e. 0.8, as calibrated by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010a) for the US, plus 3 and 5 to make the tran sition between regimes even smoother or more abrupt.
alternative models
As mentioned earlier alternative models are extended by one variable, i.e. private consumption and private investment in turn, ordered after output and before the government revenue (tax) variable. When the effects of different spending compo nents are analyzed, then the component under investigation replaces the go vernment spending variable in the extended model. Similarly, when direct and indirect tax effects are studied, the net taxes variable is replaced 32 .
effects on private consumption and private investment
Government spending, as well as a tax shock, exercises a Keynesian effect on private consumption. As shown in table 6 a positive government spending shock 31 HP filtered output gap with λ=1600 and λ=480 (the first is standard for quarterly data, while for the latter refer to Bouthevillain et al., 2001 ). 32 It is important to point out that in the case of an extended SVAR model the equation regarding net taxes needs to be adjusted for additional exogenous elasticities, presented in appendix B. the power of fiscal multipliers in croatia financial theory and practice 38 (2) 173-219 (2014) increases private consumption, while a positive tax shock decreases the same ma croeconomic variable. Moreover, it is possible to observe that the multiplier is much higher (and signifi cant) in recession, while fiscal multipliers in expansion times seem to be mostly insignificant. According to the SVAR approach a one kuna government spending increase will on impact raise private consumption by four lipa, but in the long term the effect will reach 1.22 kuna. In contrast, a one kuna increase in taxes will on impact decrease private consumption by just two lipa, but in the long term the decrement is about 46 lipa.
If the regime-switch model is considered then in downturn times the effect of the multiplier is much stronger and has a stronger effect on boosting the economy. That is, if during recessions an increase in government spending of one kuna oc curs, private consumption will rise by 1.07 kuna on average per quarter during the first two years. On the other hand the effect on private investment is meager and insignificant (table 7) .
It is possible to notice that effects of fiscal policy on private investment are mostly significant at impact when a positive spending shock raises private investment and a positive tax shock leads to a negative effect on private investment. The multi plier effect is thus stronger in recessions than in expansions, the average tax mul tiplier not being significant in the medium-and long-term. 
effect of different spending components
As mentioned in the introductory section a number of countries implemented fi scal stimuli packages during the latest financial crisis. In order to investigate what spending category would be at most effective in the Croatian case this section presents fiscal multipliers with respect to output, private consumption and private investment for three main government spending categories, i.e. spending for pur chases of goods and services, spending for wages and capital spending. Table 8 presents multipliers of spending for purchases of goods and services and it is noticeable that in the case of a regime-switching model the multipliers are higher than in the case of the linear approach. If considering the latter a one kuna increase in spending for purchases of goods and services at impact decreases ou tput and private consumption by three and one lipa respectively, the effect being much larger in three years, i.e. there is increase of 33 and 24 lipa respectively.
On the other hand during recessions the average multiplier is higher in the first eight quarters, meaning that a one kuna increase in this spending component will raise output, private consumption and private investment by 3.89, 2.16 and 0.61 kuna respectively. In all these cases the effect is significant. It is interesting that the impact of a spending shock in expansionary times is shown to be high but statistically insignificant. Spending for wages does not exercise as large an effect on macroeconomic varia bles as spending for purchases of goods and services. Table 9 presents the results and it is shown that the effect is not significant in most of the cases, for both output cumulative multipliers are insignificant, as are one or two average multipliers in recession times and all multipliers in expansionary times. Nevertheless, in a linear setting, on impact a one kuna increase in spending for wages raises output, pri vate consumption and private investment on impact by four, two and nine lipa respec tively. In recessionary times the same impact is 4.04, 2.22 and 0.58 kuna respecti vely on average for the first eight quarters.
A one-kuna increase in capital spending will increase output and private con sumption on impact by 47 and 12 lipa respectively. In the medium term the effect on output will be more prominent because according to the SVAR approach ou tput will increase 1.20 kuna in three years (table 10) .
As in the case of other spending components, the effect of a capital spending shock is much higher during economic downturns than in expansions when in addition it is seen to be insignificant. Although it is expected that a government investment will increase private investment, the SVAR approach is not conclusive regard this fact, while the multiplier in the case of a recession in the regime-switch model is lower than one. 
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The results are similar and in line with the significance time horizon to those of Grdović Gnip (2013) , where spending components were disaggregated into cur rent and capital in a five-variable Blanchard and Perotti SVAR approach.
concluding remarks
During the latest financial crisis a large number of countries and respective econo mic authorities opted for fiscal policy measures to boost economic activity. This paper investigates the effectiveness of fiscal multipliers on the Croatian case and shows that an expansionary fiscal policy during recessions could be a powerful stabilization tool. It is shown that in a regime-switch model the multipliers are much larger than in a no-regime switch approach.
A one-kuna increase in government spending would lead to an increase in output of more than 2 kuna in the medium and long term in economic downturns. Accor ding to the SVAR approach a government spending of one kuna will on impact raise private consumption by four lipa, but in the long term the effect will be 1.22 kuna. In contrast, an increase in taxes of one kuna will on impact decrease private consumption by just two lipa, but in the long term the decrement is about 46 lipa. If during recessions an increase in government spending of one kuna occurs, pri vate consumption will rise by 1.07 kuna on average per quarter during the first two years.
When investigating the possible trilemma concerning spending for purchases of goods and services, wages or capital goods, there are actually no doubts in times of recessions. That is, the effect of the shock in the purchase of goods and services is significant throughout the whole time horizon and a one kuna increase in this component will raise output, private consumption and private investment by 3.89, 2.16 and 0.61 kuna respectively. Nevertheless, these results can be considered as indicative since there is a need to extend the research in two main directions. On the one hand the effects of different taxes (direct and indirect) in a regime-switching model should be investigated. The Croatian government made a number of discretionary changes (mainly with respect to taxes and not spending) during the latest recession (starting with the crisis tax, the VAT rate increment and so on), which according to the literature could not be considered as counter-cyclical. Since this research has shown that the effects of taxes (as well as spending) are larger and more significant in recessionary times such government decisions may have deepened the recession (keeping in mind that nothing particularly "strong" has been done on the expenditure side of the budget to offset the effects of the tax measures). This may be one of the key issues why Croatia has experienced one of the longest recession periods amid EU countries.
On the other hand, no research in the field of fiscal multipliers based on the Croa tian case has so far provided information about the possible driving forces of fiscal multipliers such as indebtedness or openness to trade, either in linear or in nonlinear models. This extension would show the effect of particular economic fac tors on fiscal multipliers and would exhibit whether the magnitude of the multi pliers would change and in which direction.
On top of that, it is important to point out that this paper uses consolidated central government data because consolidated general government data for Croatia are available only from 2004 onward. Using the latter data set would imply a short time-span, which could affect the power of test, and not only in the SVAR setup, but especially in the STVAR setup where the baseline already includes additional variables. Furthermore, encompassing just the period 2004-2012 would mean ha ving two additional limitations: (1) the data would embrace only one recession period and this could also affect the results, since it is better to have as many "jumps" between different states of the economy as possible, plus (2) the "only recession period" would be represented by the latest crisis, which comes at the end of the observation period meaning that there is (still) no registered switch (and or data set) to a following subsequent recovering/expansionary phase.
Therefore, when the potential period under investigation involves a longer time series (and therefore a higher number of observations) not necessitating particular assumptions that restrict the tests by possibly doing harm to the degrees of free dom, a non-linear approach at the general government level should be considered. This could make the results of fiscal policy effects more precise. Moreover, an extended observation sample would permit an "extended" baseline STVAR (or another regime switching) model by incorporating more endogenous or exoge nous variables, resulting in even more accurate estimations. 33 Following Grdović Gnip (2011) the output elasticity of unemployment-related expenditures is -0.58, and these expenditures amount to 0.85% of total central government expenditures, which allows for a -0.01 correc tion of the total tax elasticity, to obtain the output elasticity of net taxes. The last restriction again comes out of the assumption whether government deci des first on taxes or spending. Since the results proved to be robust in the baseline model under the assumption that spending comes first in the Croatian case, all alternative models are in line with that choice and therefore again .
For example, the just-identified SVAR model extended for private consumption would be the following:
.
In the case when the effects of a particular sending component, like government expenditure for wages for instance, are under investigation, then the latter replaces the (total) government spending in the model ordered first. 34 Recall Caldara and Kamps (2008) for a detailed insight into assumptions behind such ordering. Alternative STVAR models represent a five-variable model (since in the baseline specification in comparison with SVAR models there is already an extra variable, i.e. the unanticipated component of the fiscal instrument) extended again for an output component . If we again consider the example of the extended model for private consumption, then the response of the latter after a government spending shock would be an extension of equation (24) 
